



Observatory for cyber-Risk Insights and Outages of Networks

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
Acknowledgements

- NSF: CRI ORION: Observatory for Cyber-Risk Insights and Outages of Networks
 - Michalis Kallitsis, Zakir Durumeric (Stanford)
- NSF: ATD: Extremal Dependence and Change-point Detection Methods for High-dimensional Data Streams with Applications to Network Cybersecurity
 - Stilian Stoev (UM), George Michailidis (Florida), Michalis Kallitsis
- DHS S&T: CAO E: Characterizing Malware Behaviors using Darknet Data
 - John Yen (Penn State), Michalis Kallitsis

Talk Outline

1. Current developments with Merit's network telescope
2. Reactive and distributed honeynet: early explorations
3. Research case study: classification of Darknet events

MERIT'S NETWORK TELESCOPE (DARKNET)




1. ORION network telescope

ORION network telescope in numbers

- Currently, approximately a **/13 subnet** (ie, about 500,000 unique IPs)
 - Down from our own /8 but still quite large
- 120GB/day compressed PCAP data
- Started renewing our infrastructure in 2018 with support from **NSF CRI** grant


ORION network telescope in numbers — Darknet traffic

Hourly graph




ORION network telescope in numbers — Darknet traffic

Yearly graph




ORION network telescope in numbers

Unique Source IPs



ORION data pipeline



ORION data pipeline

- **Continuous** (i.e., state preserving) parsing of PCAP files
 - Parse on hourly basis
 - Extract “Darknet events”: Go software: <https://github.com/Merit-Research/darknet-events>
- Events “keyed” by (**source IP, port, traffic type**)
- **Traffic type** examples (full list: <https://github.com/Merit-Research/darknet-events/blob/master/README.md>):
 - TCP SYN (i.e., scanning)
 - ICMP Echo Request (i.e., scanning)
 - TCP SYN/ACK (i.e., backscatter)
 - TCP RST (i.e., backscatter)

ORION data pipeline – Config parameters

- **Timeout interval**: after how long to “expire” events and remove from cache
 - See “flow timeout problem”: Network Telescopes: Technical Report, Moore at al., https://www.caida.org/catalog/papers/2004_tr_2004_04/tr-2004-04.pdf
 - Typical longest gap “rule”: we use about 10 minutes (this would prevent “splitting” a scan with duration 2 days and rate 100pps for our Darknet size)
 - The Longest Run of Heads, Mark F. Schilling, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2686886>
- **Unique destinations**: we just use 1
- **Samples**: store up to 3 packets using reservoir sampling


Approach Advantages

- Ease of data **analysis**: use standard SQL to process TBs in secs
- Ease of data **sharing**
 - Important: external users share the cost, i.e., “pay on demand” model
- Ease of data **“joins”** with external datasets (e.g., Censys, M-Lab)
- Ease of data **visualizations** for quick exploration (i.e., via Data Studio)
- Lossy **compression**


Approach Disadvantages

- **Lossy** compression
- Diminished ability for fine-grained **time series**
 - Though we have some ideas to (approximately) fix this
- Can become **expensive**
 - Storage and processing (queries) are charged
 - \$5 per 1TB of data processed
- Handling control to a **3rd party**


Analysis case study: scanning durations of 18 billion events



Analysis case study: scanning durations of 18 billion events



Analysis case study: scanning durations of 18 billion events





HoneyTrap


The most flexible honeypot
framework.

2. ORION Canary deployment

HoneyTrap Open Source project

- <https://docs.honeytrap.io>
 - Actively maintained by DTact (previously DutchSec)
 - Key contributor: Remco Verhoef
 - Offers 10 or so high-interactivity services (such as SSH, Telnet, etc.)
 - SSH simulator: Good for catching brute-force passwords and “executed commands”
- We instead use the “low interaction” Canary sensor within HoneyTrap
- **Why Canary?**
 - Monitor all ports (we sacrifice only one high-numbered TCP port used for SSH)
 - Get some extra visibility into the TCP payloads (when available)
 - Easy to distribute to multiple locations

Canary's TCP State Diagram



Canary deployment




Figure 1: HoneyTrap Pipeline And System Architecture

Our Canary vantage points

- Academic institution 1: 64 unique IPs
- Academic institution 2: 1 IP
- Academic institution 3 (Merit): /24 deployment (currently 64 unique IPs)
- Cloud providers: AWS and Google (between 2 and 100 unique IPs)
- Orchestration managed with **Ansible scripts** which makes adding new nodes (relatively) easy

Summary

- New ORION infrastructure in production since 2020
- Data on BigQuery: easily sharable, analyzed, joined with other data
- Enables rapid experimentation / visualizations, supports our Darknet research (clustering, extremal dependence, etc.), supports data for education
- ORION's Canary: towards a distributed & reactive honeypot
 - Data also in BigQuery

Thank You!

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